This opinion essay is written by Lt. Col. John J. Dick and Lt. Col. Daniel D. Phillips, the commanding officer and executive officer of the 3rd Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion. The observations and opinions presented are their own and not those of the U.S. Marine Corps.
Imagine yourself as a Marine in the 3rd Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion, proudly wearing the insignia of a unit that blends speed with lethality. You’re in your early twenties — perhaps only eighteen — shaped by some of the toughest combat training the U.S. military offers. You know your mission inside and out: move fast, find the enemy, and report back, embodying the spirit of Light Armored Reconnaissance.
You are in one of the most demanding and high-pressure roles in the entire U.S. military, and you are pretty sure you have the best job in the world.
Yet a gnawing concern grows as you push forward, skirting the flanks of larger Marine formations. The newly integrated Ultra-Light Tactical Vehicle (ULTV) you and your fellow Marines ride in is nimble and fast. But it lacks protection and firepower on a battlefield of Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS), tanks, or modern infantry fighting vehicles. Once formidable, the LAV-25’s 25mm cannon is no match for modern armor and offers little protection against direct hits. You and your fellow Marines must rely on tactics and maneuver — a dangerous gamble against peer adversaries.
As light reconnaissance battalion leaders, we see these gaps as urgent and tangible. Speed and stealth alone are not enough. Marines need a direct-fire platform that can survive and dominate in close combat. We propose integrating the M10 Booker into future Mobile Reconnaissance Battalion formations. Its 105mm cannon and tracked durability would transform our ability to fight for information and keep pace against adversaries with real armor. The M10 is not a luxury — it’s an operational necessity, bridging the gap between maneuver and lethality to ensure Marines prevail when contact is made.
A force caught between vision and reality
“Constantly test our assumptions, constantly war game, constantly experiment, watch the threats, watch the adversary, watch technology, and be willing to make adjustments along the way. So we’re in step one of 10 maybe. This isn’t the final chapter and we’re not done with it. This is actually just the beginning.”
— Gen. David H. Berger, War on the Rocks, 2020
The Marine Corps launched Force Design to modernize the force for great power competition, aiming to replace outdated systems with precision fires, unmanned platforms, and advanced digital networks. Although the vision is clear, execution has not kept pace. The Corps has shown a genuine commitment to innovation, but it continues to face challenges in fielding new capabilities at the scale and speed the evolving threat environment demands.
This gap is most evident in the Light Armored Reconnaissance community’s transition to the Mobile Reconnaissance Battalion. Though doctrinally justified, the doctrinal shift has outpaced materiel solutions. The Marine Corps sent its last M1 Abrams to the Army in 2020. While it did introduce programs like the Armored Reconnaissance Vehicle and the squad-level use of attack drones under Organic Precision Fires, other delays and cancellations have stalled progress. Unlike the Infantry Battalion Experiment — which added medics, scouts, additional mortars and other capabilities to traditional formations — the Marine Corps has not completed a key, comprehensive review for the Mobile Reconnaissance Battalion concept, known as the DOTMLPEFP review, for Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership & Education, Personnel, and Faculties-Policy validation.
Delays in key acquisition programs continue to strain the Marine Corps’ ground combat element. The Amphibious Combat Vehicle has suffered from mechanical issues that limit its reliability in littoral environments. The Corps canceled the Organic Precision Fires-Mounted program in favor of lighter alternatives, while cybersecurity concerns sidelined the Long Range Unmanned Surface Vessel. The Ultra Light Tactical Vehicle program ended in 2024 without replacement, and the Navy/Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System remains in testing. Long-range fires may not be fielded until 2030, and the Army’s Next Generation Squad Weapon program has faced criticism from within the ranks and a supply chain that is not yet fully online. As a result, Light Armored Reconnaissance units are taking on new missions without the tools or capabilities needed to succeed.
Armor isn’t going away
Armor remains relevant across today’s battlefields, from Ukraine to the Indo-Pacific. European nations continue to modernize their armored forces, as seen in Poland’s purchase of K2 tanks and Sweden’s acquisition of CV90s, supported by the European Union’s €150 billion ($173 billion) defense investment. Meanwhile, China is advancing its armored capabilities and deploying counter-drone and directed energy systems. These global trends reflect a clear consensus: armor still matters, if adapted to modern threats.
The Marine Corps’ 2020 tank divestment was driven by strategic priorities, but evolving conditions warrant reconsideration. Fielding armor like the M10 Booker would restore direct-fire support and align the Corps with broader modernization efforts and the operational divide between mobility, survivability, and lethality. As the European Council on Foreign Relations notes, tanks remain relevant when integrated into contemporary warfare systems.
A missing capability at the worst possible time
In the Indo-Pacific, this modernization lag has left the Marine Corps in a dangerous capability trough — neither equipped with legacy systems nor armed with replacements. Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations and Littoral Operations in a Contested Environment require equipped forces to sense, strike, and survive, but the current inventory of light, fast vehicles and lack of heavy, direct fire mean we risk being able to detect and deter but not decisively engage.
Though these shortcomings are tactical, they must be solved in acquisitions. As the Center for Strategic and International Studies warns, “the challenge for Force Design is not the concept, but the lag between divestment and capability replacement. That gap represents a period of strategic vulnerability.” If capability fielding remains slow, Force Design’s foundational assumptions may falter. As Keenan Chirhart wrote in a recent War on the Rocks analysis: “The Marine Corps should work to flatten the entire landscape and move from concept to capability to acquisition faster than an adversary can make that capability obsolete.” In other words, the Corps must prioritize near-term investments in survivable mobility, precision fires, and recon modernization to avoid a scenario where our forces can find the enemy, but do little about it.
Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth canceled the Army’s M10 Booker program not because he doubted the vehicle’s capabilities, but to support his broader vision of building a more agile and adaptable U.S. force posture. In his May 1, 2025, directive, Hegseth emphasized that the future fight will demand platforms that are “not just powerful, but agile, survivable, and deployable in complex theaters.” The strategy will shift our emphasis away from traditional mechanized formations toward distributed, mobile units that can engage across multiple domains — maritime to mountains, but also air and even space and cyber — that Force Design envisions.
While the cancellation signaled the end of the Booker’s path in the Army, it simultaneously created an opportunity for the Marine Corps. The Marine Corps now has the chance to reevaluate the M10 Booker through a different lens — one that prizes expeditionary utility, direct fire capability, and integration with stand-in forces. The Booker may not be the system the Army wants, but it may be what the Marine Corps needs under evolving reconnaissance and maneuver doctrine.
Why the Marine Corps should integrate the M10 Booker
The Marine Corps is evolving under Force Design to prepare for high-end conflict in contested maritime environments. At the heart of this evolution is the transition from Light Armored Reconnaissance to Mobile Reconnaissance Battalions, which reflects a broader shift in how the Marine Corps expects its reconnaissance forces to shape the battlespace. As Marine Corps doctrine (MCDP 1-0 Operations) makes clear, reconnaissance units must do more than observe—they must actively fight for information and influence enemy decisions.
The Mobile Reconnaissance Battalion is to be made up of three companies, one of which is Light Mobile Reconnaissance (LMR). LMR companies will be equipped with ultra-light tactical vehicles (ULTV) and dismounted sensors. With minimal firepower and almost no armored protection, these units must either avoid contact or depend heavily on external fire support.
In contrast, the M10 Booker provides a self-contained capability to detect, fix, and finish enemy forces. Armed with a 105mm cannon, coaxial 7.62mm machine gun, and commander’s .50 caliber weapon station, the M10 Booker offers versatile firepower suitable for counter-reconnaissance, blocking operations, or support to seizure of key terrain. Its employment would enable the Mobile Reconnaissance Battalion to transition from a passive observer to a combat-capable maneuver element.
Surviving and communicating on a modern battlefield
Force Design emphasizes distributed maritime operations, but this distribution must not come at the expense of survivability. Army Engineers designed the M10 Booker to survive in high-threat environments. Its armor package protects against small arms, indirect fire fragments, and medium-caliber munitions. In practical terms, Mobile Reconnaissance Battalions equipped with M10s can persist under fire, conduct reconnaissance-in-force, and survive encounters with enemy mechanized forces. Ultra Light Tactical Vehicles, in contrast, are highly vulnerable and must disengage at first contact.
The M10 Booker could also play a key command-and-control role on the battlefield. It could be adapted as a hub for the Marines’ Network-On-The-Move concept, and integrate into emerging communications systems like the ALL.SPACE multi-band satellite communications.
Logistics and the ‘right to repair’
One of the main concerns about bringing armor back into the Marine Corps has been sustainment. However, the M10 Booker offers a more expeditionary alternative to the heavier M1A1 Abrams, with reduced weight, improved mobility, and lower logistical demand. Weighing between 38 and 42 tons, the M10 can be airlifted by a C-17 (one per flight) and transported by both Landing Craft Air Cushion and Ship-to-Shore Connectors. It runs on a fuel-efficient diesel engine and requires less maintenance than a traditional main battle tank.
While critics argue that armor reduces maritime agility, the M10’s lighter weight and strategic lift compatibility strike a balance between survivability and mobility.
But to unlock its full potential within the stand-in force concept, the Marine Corps must avoid inheriting the Army’s legacy sustainment model, which relies heavily on centralized contractor support. The Army’s experience with the M10 — characterized by high costs and limited maintenance flexibility — highlights the risks of a static, depot-based logistics approach ill-suited for expeditionary operations.
For Marine forces operating forward in contested spaces, sustainment must be as agile as maneuver. Integrating the M10 Booker into the force will require a new maintenance model aligned with Force Design principles — one that empowers Marine maintainers to conduct field-level repairs using scalable diagnostics, digital technical data, and additive manufacturing. The Corps should adopt a hybrid approach, similar to naval aviation, where Marines handle most maintenance organically, with limited depot-level support from General Dynamics. Contracts should also include expeditionary repair kits, 3D-printable files, and tailored logistics packages. In contested logistics, sustaining armored platforms at the edge is essential.
Historical precedent and an opportunity
The Marine Corps has a long history of turning Army-rejected platforms into operational assets. In the early 1980s, it adopted the Light Armored Vehicle-25 after the Army dropped the program, gaining a fast, amphibious, and lethal platform that served effectively for over four decades. The M10 Booker presents a similar opportunity. With over 100 units already built or contracted, the Corps can capitalize on sunk costs by pursuing one of three resourcing strategies grounded in past success and doctrinal logic.
First, the Marine Corps could replicate its 1991–1992 acquisition of the M1A1 Abrams by requesting M10s through an Army transfer at no procurement cost, assuming full sustainment responsibilities. This “zero acquisition” model could save $12–15 million per unit but would place long-term lifecycle costs, estimated at $3.5–4 million per vehicle, on Marine Corps budgets. It would also require retooling logistics, training pipelines, and shifting away from the Army’s contractor-heavy sustainment model toward a more expeditionary approach, as outlined in the Marine Corps logistics doctrine.
Second, the Corps could pursue a joint procurement agreement with the Army, similar to past efforts like the now-canceled Joint Light Tactical Vehicle, formalized through a Memorandum of Agreement. A coordinated acquisition effort would allow the services to share costs, align production timelines, and include Marine-specific modifications like lighter armor packages. Entering during Lot 3 or later could reduce unit cost to $11–13 million and yield additional savings on bulk sustainment.
Finally, the Marine Corps could fund an independent Program of Record using rapid acquisition authorities under 10 U.S. Code § 4022, allowing full configuration control. While this offers maximum flexibility, it carries the highest cost, potentially $1.2–1.4 billion over a decade for 80–90 vehicles, along with added investments in training infrastructure and new Military Occupational Specialties.
Each strategy reflects viable paths to restoring armored firepower within the Corps, consistent with Force Design’s focus on flexible, joint-capable formations. Treating the M10 as a modern successor to the LAV — repurposed, upgraded, and resourced for expeditionary use —would close the Corps’ armor gap without compromising its operational agility.
As the Army decides what to do with the M10, there are possibilities within the Marine Corps. The M10 Booker could integrate into Marine Corps Light Armored Reconnaissance battalions to address the current capability gap by providing mobile, protected direct-fire support essential for modern reconnaissance missions. Alternatively, the Marine Corps could field the M10 during the transition from the Light Armored Vehicle to the Advanced Reconnaissance Vehicle in the early 2030s. The Army nearly completed the testing and evaluation for the M10 Booker, where it was scheduled for fielding to Army units starting in the fourth quarter of the 2025 fiscal year, before its cancellation. The M10’s design offers enhanced lethality and survivability, enabling Light Armored Reconnaissance and Mobile Reconnaissance Battalion units to effectively engage fortified positions and light armored threats, thus restoring a critical combined-arms function within the Marine Corps’ expeditionary framework.
As contested maritime environments become the norm, reconnaissance units must go beyond passive observation — they must actively fight for information, deny the enemy freedom of movement, and shape the battlespace to enable decisive action. The integration of the M10 Booker into the Light Armored Reconnaissance/Mobile Reconnaissance Battalion is not simply a platform solution — it is a doctrinal pivot that restores balance to Force Design and reclaims combat credibility for Marine reconnaissance in the Marine Expeditionary Force security space.
The M10 Booker directly addresses the Corps’ current capability gap in survivable, mobile firepower. Its armor, fire control systems, and mobility allow Light Armored Reconnaissance units to survive first contact, dominate key terrain, and provide reconnaissance-in-force capabilities aligned with expeditionary advanced base operations and stand-in force concepts. Unlike legacy Light Armored Vehicle platforms, which prioritized mobility over protection, the Booker delivers both lethality and survivability, enabling reconnaissance marines to maneuver under fire, mass effects, and conduct shaping operations forward of the main force.
Much as the light armored vehicles revolutionized mobile reconnaissance during the Cold War, the M10 Booker can redefine it for the peer fight. If the Marine Corps intends to project power as a credible stand-in force, it must equip its reconnaissance units to see the enemy and close with and destroy him when required. Just as the Light Armored vehicle transformed mobile reconnaissance in the late 20th century, the M10 can define its future. If the Marine Corps is to maintain credibility as a Stand-In force in contested maritime theaters, it must ensure its reconnaissance elements are not just eyes and ears but teeth.
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