The West’s inglorious exit from Afghanistan has sparked a long-awaited reckoning for NATO and has fueled major questions about the role the alliance is capable of playing in the 21st century — and to what degree it can rely so heavily on U.S. leadership and U.S. military assets moving forward.
With NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg this week making his first visit to Washington since the fall of Kabul in late August, alliance watchers say there’s a deep sense of “unease” in Brussels and across Europe, from London to Berlin and beyond, as a host of high-stakes issues have risen to the surface over just a matter of months and threatened some of NATO‘s cohesiveness and core tenets.
President Biden’s decision to pull all American troops from Afghanistan immediately forced NATO nations to do the same, confirming that the alliance lacks the ability to conduct major military and intelligence missions without Washington in the lead. The chaotic, deadly exit also shook Europe’s faith in America’s steadiness and reliability, potentially chipping away at the foundation of the transatlantic partnership that’s stood since the early days of the Cold War.
On the heels of the withdrawal, Australia’s decision to cancel a major submarine contract with France and instead forge a new security partnership with the U.S. and Britain underscored a global shift in security priorities toward the Pacific and China, specifically. How a defense pact with “North Atlantic” in its name fits into the Asian power puzzle is an unanswered question.
Mr. Stoltenberg, a Norwegian whose current term as alliance head expires in September 2022, on Monday met with President Biden, Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin and other top administration officials to discuss the alliance’s path ahead and the role it can play in global economic and military competition with Beijing. At the same time, Secretary of State Antony Blinken is set to meet with French officials on Tuesday in an effort to mend fences following the submarine contract cancellation.
But specialists say the series of meetings Monday and Tuesday may not be enough to change the perception that the U.S. relationship with NATO is changing rapidly and that Mr. Stoltenberg and other alliance leaders haven’t yet figured out exactly how to adapt. Mr. Biden, Europeans say, says the right things, but the first 10 months of his administration have been unexpectedly rocky for transatlantic ties.
“You’ve got this unease in Brussels and in NATO capitals that the U.S. is kind of unpredictable,” said Jim Townsend, former deputy assistant secretary of defense for European and NATO policy during the Obama administration. “We’ve had four years of [former President Donald] Trump, which was a roller coaster. And Biden said ‘we’re back.’ But some one-off things have happened that have tested theory. Is the U.S. on an arc where they’re really not so interested in Europe? They don’t know on the arc of history where America really stands.”
“You say ‘America is back,” but it doesn’t feel that way,” he said.
At the same time, Mr. Townsend said the Afghan withdrawal served as an eye-opener for NATO nations.
“They couldn’t stay there on their own two feet and in some capitals that concerned them,” he said.
U.S. leaders made clear Monday that they expect NATO to revamp its approach. In readouts of conversations with Mr. Stoltenberg on Monday, both the White House and State Department stressed the importance of the alliance’s upcoming “Strategic Concept,” a landmark document expected to be released next year.
“President Biden reaffirmed his strong support for NATO and the importance of bolstering deterrence and defense against strategic competitors and transnational threats,” the White House said. “President Biden also conveyed our full support for the NATO agenda agreed by leaders in June, including ensuring the alliance is fully equipped and resourced to address the modern threat environment, and developing a new “Strategic Concept.’”
Questions across Europe
But the Afghan failure and the new U.S.-U.K.-Australian defense pact have some in Europe — led by French President Emmanuel Macron — dusting off long-deferred plans for a separate European Union fighting force, one that would not need American support or approval to take on missions relations to European security.
In London, some officials have openly argued that it’s time for Britain and other European nations to bolster their own national security prowess in the hopes of avoiding future scenarios where U.S. decisions dictate NATO moves.
In Paris, leaders are still trying to gauge the fallout from the lost submarine deal, which sparked a diplomatic standoff between the U.S. and France that Mr. Blinken will try to break this week. But more broadly, French leaders say the situation should serve as a wake-up call. A top adviser to Mr. Macron told Reuters that Mr. Macron will use a major speech on Tuesday to push the message that Europe can and must play a vital role on its own in confronting China.
“We could turn a blind eye and act as if nothing had happened. We think that would be a mistake for all Europeans,” that adviser said. “There really is an opportunity here. … We don’t want to push Europeans into making a sort of binary choice between partnership with the U.S. or Europe turning inward.”
But perhaps nowhere are the questions more pressing than in Germany. The ambiguous outcome of the country’s recent parliamentary election surely will impact the direction of NATO and overall European defense spending.
While the coalition of German parties that will ultimately take control of the Bundestag is now being negotiated, no one disputes that the longtime reign of center-right Chancellor Angela Merkel, a proponent of NATO and of a robust role for Germany in the alliance, has come to an end in Berlin.
Mrs. Merkel’s Christian Democratic Union (CDU) party came in second in the Sept. 26 election. Germany’s Social Democratic Party won the biggest share of seats in the Bund and is now seeking to form a ruling coalition with either the country’s Green Party or the pro-business Free Democratic Party.
This matters, according to analysts, because neither the Greens nor the Free Democrats are keen to back a more robust NATO led by the United States.
“A CDU-led government would have largely guaranteed the continuation of the old-style U.S.-European relationship, centered around NATO and relying on German participation in collective defense and political arrangements,” according to Ulrike Franke, a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, where she focuses on German and European defense.
Ms. Franke did, however, assert that the coming coalition in Germany could end up being “good news” for a new transatlantic alliance focused on the U.S. and Europe “countering China together.”
Mrs. Merkel’s CDU coalition was dubious of the confrontational drift of the U.S.-Chinese rivalry, particularly given the importance of the Chinese market for German exporters. Germany was the primary driver of an EU-China investment pact last year that was negotiated despite the clear disapproval of the incoming Biden administration.
Berlin‘s attitude could shift significantly if a new coalition forms in Germany without Mrs. Merkel’s party, according to Ms. Franke.
“The two smaller parties that will make or break any German coalition — the Greens and the liberal Free Democrats (FDP) — are inclined toward a stronger stance against China,” she wrote.